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COMMENTS

MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: THE EX-CELL-O DOCTRINE
REVISITED
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA or Act) was
enacted in California in 1975 in an attempt "to ensure peace
in the agricultural fields by guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers and stability in labor relations and to bring
certainty and a sense of fair play to a presently unstable and
potentially volatile condition in the state."' The ALRA was
modeled in large part after the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)2 of 1935, which specifically excluded agriculture from
its coverage. Among the most important organizational provisions of the ALRA is section 1148, which declares that the
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB or Board)3 "shall
follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended." '4 Other substantive provisions within the
ALRA were designed both to accommodate the special needs
of the agricultural industry and to strengthen provisions in
the NLRA which would have been deficient if applied to agriculture.6 One such divergence from the NLRA is the express
grant of statutory authority given to the Board to order a
monetary remedy when an employer engages in the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain in good faith. This remedy
1981 by Mary Lynne Thaxter
1. California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, § 1, CAL. LAB. CODE §§
1140-1166 (West Supp. 1981).
2. National Labor Relations Act (1935), as amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1976).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1141(a) (West Supp. 1981) provides that: "there is hereby
created in state government the Agricultural Labor Relations Board ......
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1980).
5. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 - La Esperanza De California Para El Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 783 (1975).
0
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is referred to as "make-whole" relief. The NLRA contains no
express statutory provision for make-whole relief, and the
NLRB, for this reason as well as others 7 has consistently refused to grant such an award.'
A make-whole order is designed to grant a monetary
award to employees in compensation for losses incurred as a
result of an employer's unlawful refusal to bargain immediately upon the union's demand. The amount of the award reflects the "increased benefits" the employees would have
gained had the employer bargained.'
The ALRB originally held that make-whole relief is appropriate in any refusal to bargain case, including the situation where an employer commits a "technical" refusal to bargain 10 for the purpose of obtaining judicial review of a
representation election. The California Supreme Court recently reversed the Board's position,' however, and held that
the Board lacks authority to impose make-whole relief in a
categorical fashion when an employer is found guilty of an unfair labor practice solely as a result of a technical refusal to
bargain."2 The court instead instructed the Board that makewhole relief is "appropriate" only when an employer commits
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1981) provides in part: "If ... the
board shall be of the opinion that any person... has engaged in... any such unfair
labor practice, the board .. shall issue ... an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, to take affirmative action, including ...
making employees whole, when the board deems such relief appropriate, for the loss
of pay resulting from the employer's refusal to bargain .... " (Emphasis added.)
7. See text accompanying notes 49-89 infra.
8. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Auto Workers v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971). (NLRB is without statutory
authority to direct make-whole relief for employer's refusal to bargain.)
9. McGuiness, Is the Award of Damages for Refusals to Bargain Consistent
with National Labor Policy?, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1086, 1089 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as McGuiness].
10. Under the ALRA, as with the NLRA, the refusal to bargain by the employer, with the expected filing of an unfair labor practice charge by a union, is the
only procedure by which an employer can obtain court review of a Board certification
of a union. Only after an employer is judged guilty of an unfair labor practice may it
then appeal and obtain court review of both the unfair labor practice and the Board's
certification decision. Such a course of action is referred to as a "technical" refusal to
bargain. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); A.F. of L. v. Labor
Board, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, 66 Cal. App. 3d 781,
136 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1977).
11. J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1979). (California ALRB may not impose make-whole relief in a categorical fashion
against an employer found guilty of a "technical" refusal to bargain.)
12. Id. at 29, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
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a clear and flagrant refusal to bargain designed to stifle employee organization.' s It is the writer's opinion that the California court has been too limited even in this holding, and
should have gone beyond the initial consideration of the "appropriateness" of the make-whole order to an examination of
the order's legality in light of NLRB precedent and provisions
contained within the ALRA."
An examination by the California Supreme Court beyond
its initial consideration is necessary because make-whole relief
may presently be imposed by the ALRB in an initial refusal
to bargain situation. This imposition occurs when the company and the union have not commenced to bargain, and consequently, have not reached any type of agreement. The
award, at this early stage, is calculated by using a standard set
forth by the Board 5 which utilizes the terms and conditions
of other parties' contracts. In adopting this method of calculation, however, the ALRB has overlooked well-defined NLRB
precedent,' 6 as well as a specific ALRA provision that the
Board lacks power to compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.' 7 The imposition of
terms and conditions of other parties' contracts, however,
does compel an employer to agree to proposals which he has
had no part in formulating.
This comment will trace the development of the makewhole award in refusal to bargain cases under both the NLRA
and the ALRA. It will then contrast the NLRB's position with
respect to the award with that taken by the ALRB and the
13. Id. at 39, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
14. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1981) which provides in part:
"[T]o bargain collectively in good faith is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the agricultural employer and the representative of the agricultural employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith ... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
15. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (April 26, 1978).
There, the ALRB examined 37 other agricultural contracts to determine the average
negotiated wage rates, and then ordered the employer to make its employees whole

for the "net" difference between the basic wage rate in effect at the time of the unfair
labor practice, and the average negotiated wage rate of these 37 contracts. See text
accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
16. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd and remanded sub noma.
Auto Workers v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tiidee Prods. Inc., 174
N.L.R.B. 705 (1969), application for enforcement granted and case remanded sub
noa. IUEW v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
17. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1981). Section 8(d) of the NLRA
contains an identical restriction. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
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California Supreme Court. The comment then will examine
the legal grounds suggested by various amicus curiae for challenging imposition of the award, before concluding that the
restrictions against imposition set forth by the NLRB should
apply equally to the ALRB. The ALRB is thus properly
bound by these restrictions despite the express grant of authority given the Board to issue the make-whole award.

II.

THE SCOPE OF REMEDIAL POWER UNDER THE
VERSUS THE SCOPE UNDER THE

A.

ALRA

NLRA

History of the Make-Whole Order Under the ALRA

Under the ALRA, both the employer and the union have
an obligation to bargain collectively with each other in good
faith.18 An employer commits an unfair labor practice when he
refuses to bargain collectively in good faith with the union
representing the workers that he employs, 19 and the ALRB is
empowered "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice .... ,
Many commentators have argued that an employer's refusal to bargain causes serious consequences, specifically,
financial injury to the employees and corresponding enrichment of the employer. 1 The consequences flow from the fact
that during the delay in bargaining, employee support of the
union usually wanes significantly, 2 and injury is imposed
upon the employees in the form of delayed or ultimately nonexistent contract benefits such as increased wages.23 The
longer the employer breaks the law, the more he is said to
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1981). See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976).
19. CAL. LAB.CODE § 1153(e) (West Supp. 1981) provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an agricultural employer ... (e) to refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith with labor organizations ......
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160 (West Supp. 1981).
21. Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-toBargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schlossberg & Silard].
22. IUEW v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 950
(1970). Employee interest in a union can diminish quickly as working conditions re-

main apparently unaffected by the union or collective bargaining. Thus, when the
company is finally ordered to bargain with the union some years later, the union may
find that it represents only a small fraction of the employees. Id. Cf. McGuiness,
supra note 9, at 1101.
23. Schlossberg & Silard, supra note 21, at 1064.
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profit at the expense of the wronged workers. 2 '
The ALRB derives its authority to deal with employer refusals to bargain from section 1160.3 of the ALRA. s5 That section provides the "standard" remedy, also provided for under
the NLRA, for the Board to "enter an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice
... ,,2It has been observed in the past, most significantly
with respect to the NLRA, that this standard remedy is insufficient to cope with an employer's disregard for the law, and it
has been stressed that stronger remedies would be
appropriate.
The California Legislature has considered these arguments in favor, of stronger remedies. As a result, the legislature provided, for a monetary award to employees for the employer's unlawful refusal to bargain, in addition to the
standard cease and desist order found in the NLRA. Section
1160.3 therefore gives the Board authority to take "affirmative
action, including . . . making employees whole, when the
board deems such relief appropriate, for the loss of pay resulting from the employer's refusal to bargain .... ",28 The concurrent purposes of this make-whole remedy include compensation of employees for their losses resulting from the
employer's refusal to bargain, and encouragement of the practice of collective bargaining by removing the "profit" the employer is said to realize when he refuses to bargain in good
faith.2
The NLRA, on the other hand, contains no express provision authorizing a money award for an employer's refusal to
bargain. The scope of the NLRB's remedial power to award
"affirmative relief" has been held to be "merely incidental" to
the Board's "primary purpose.., to stop and prevent unfair
labor practices." 0 In this respect, then, while the NLRB has
24.

Id. at 1059.

25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1981). See note 6 supra.
26. Id.
27. Yates, The "Make Whole" Remedy for Employer Refusal to Bargain:Early
Experience Under the California AgriculturalLabor Relations Act, 29 LAB. L.J. 666,
667 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Yates].
28. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1981).
29. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 at 9 (April 26, 1978).
30. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1958). Power to award affirmative relief
under section 10(c) is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to stop
and prevent unfair labor practices. Congress did not establish a general scheme au-
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the power to award make-whole relief in the form of back pay
to illegally discharged employees, this power is a limited authority specifically granted to the NLRB."1
The United States Supreme Court has further cautioned
that the NLRB is not vested with a "virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures, and ... to prescribe penalties or fines which the Board may think would effectuate the
policies of the Act;"- 2 the NLRB, instead, must act to dispel
the effects of the unfair labor practice it finds," and should
3' 4
make employees whole only for "actual losses.
B. When Is Make-Whole Relief Appropriate Under the
ALRA?
1. The ALRB View
The ALRB's authority to issue a make-whole award for
an employer's refusal to bargain is limited in the Code by a
restriction ordering it only in those cases "when the board
deems such relief appropriate."" The California Legislature's
enactment of section 1160.3 clearly empowers the ALRB to
order make-whole relief, but provides no answer to the important question: under what circumstances is compensatory relief "appropriate"? The rather limited record of the legislative
history of the ALRA in general, and of section 1160.3 in particular," indicates that the legislature left the question of
"appropriateness" to the ALRB to answer in specific cases,
thorizing the Board to award full compensatory damages for injuries caused by
wrongful conduct.
31. In back pay cases, the NLRB computes what an employee would have
earned had he not been unlawfully denied employment, and subtracts what he actually earned during this period in other employment. The resulting figure is the back
pay amount and represents actual loss only. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 197-98 (1941).
32. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940). The power to command affirmative action under the NLRA is remedial, not punitive.
33. Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961). The power of
NLRB to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised
in aid of the NLRB's authority to restrain violations which are of a kind that thwart
purposes of the statute.
34. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1951). In making workers who have been denied employment whole for losses suffered on account of the
unfair labor practice, only actual losses should be made good. Thus, deductions
should be made for actual earnings by the worker and for losses which the worker
willfully incurred.
35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1981).
36. Yates, supra note 27, at 669.
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thereby establishing precedent for future cases. 7
Two cases". were brought before the ALRB in 1976 in
which the United Farmworkers (UFW) requested make-whole
relief for an employer's initial refusal to bargain following a
representation election. Testimony in those cases revealed
that each employer had committed serious unfair labor practices.3 9 The Board was thus presented for the first time with
an opportunity to respond to the "appropriateness" of the
remedy. It held that make-whole relief should be employed
"whenever an employer has been found to bargain in violation
of section 1153(e) and (a), the good faith bargaining provisions of the Act, and the employees have suffered losses of pay
as a result." 0 The Board justified this broad interpretation of
the Act's wording, authorizing the issuance of a make-whole
order for any refusal to bargain, by arguing that a refusal to
bargain struck "at the very heart of the system of labormanagement relations which the Legislature sought to create
. . "41 "Regardless of the employer's motivation, bad faith
bargaining necessarily harms employees financially, weakens
their union and confers a competitive advantage upon the employer for violating the law."' 42 The Board's argument reflects
the position taken by many commentators that the standard
cease and desist order is inadequate. It therefore laid down a
"blanket" rule requiring the imposition of make-whole relief
against an employer in any refusal to bargain case.
The rule established in these two cases was followed one
year later in J.R. Norton.43 In that case, make-whole relief
was imposed upon an employer found guilty of an unfair labor
practice because he refused to bargain in order to obtain judi37. Id.
38. Perry Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 (March 10, 1977); Adam Dairy dba
Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (April 26, 1978).
39. In Perry Farms, the employer "had steadfastly refused to recognize the
UFW as the legitimate union; had harassed, intimidated and physically abused a
union organizer; and, after the union had won a representation election and been duly

certified by the board, had refused to bargain or even to meet with the union or
supply it with requested information." Yates, supra note 27, at 670. The employer in
Adam Dairy "had engaged in a campaign of harrassment: firing, demoting, and transferring known union supporters before the election, and after union certification, continuing such practices while engaging half-heartedly in collective bargaining." Id.
40. Perry Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 at 9 (March 10, 1977).
41. Id. at 10.
42. Yates, supra note 27, at 674.
43. J.R. Norton, 3 A.L.R.B. No. 66 (May 23, 1977).
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cial review of a representation election. Due to the "blanket"
rule, an employer's action was made to fall within the scope of
the rule whenever he committed a technical refusal to bargain
in order to challenge the propriety of an election before the
courts, and such challenge was subsequently rejected."'
2. The California Supreme Court's View
The California Supreme Court reversed the Board in J.R.
Norton Co. v. ALRB "4 and held that the Board lacks authority
to impose make-whole relief in a categorical fashion when the
employer has been found guilty of an unfair labor practice resulting solely from a technical refusal to bargain. The court
observed that two competing considerations, both of which
are fundamental to ALRA policy, arise whenever a representation election is attacked. The first is the need to discourage
frivolous election challenges pursued by employers as a dilatory tactic designed to stifle self-organization by employees.
When used to that end, the court agreed that make-whole relief is appropriate." The second consideration, however, is the
important interest in fostering judicial review as a check on
arbitrary administrative action. This involves cases in which
the employer has raised a meritorious objection to an election
and the objection has been rejected by the Board. 47 It is in
serving this interest that a rule automatically imposing makewhole relief cannot be sustained. As the court observed, "such
a rule places burdensome restraints on those who legitimately
seek judicial resolution of close cases in which a potentially
meritorious claim could be made that the NLRB or ALRB
abused its discretion."" In the court's opinion, the Board

failed to acknowledge the serious deterrent impact on judicial
review when it announced the rule and when it applied it to
this case. Blanket imposition, stressed the court, unduly emphasizes compensation by ignoring the pursuit of legitimate
objections to election misconduct."'
The California Supreme Court thus has established the
standard which the ALRB must follow when it awards make44. J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, 26 Cal. 3d 1, 28, 603 P.2d 1306, 1321, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 710, 725 (1979). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
45. 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979).
46. Id. at 30-31, 603 P.2d at 1323, 160 Cal. Rptr at 726-27.
47. Id. at 30, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
48. Id. at 32, 603 P.2d at 1324, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
49. Id. at 34, 603 P.2d at 1325-26, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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whole relief in refusal to bargain cases. The Board may not
"deem such relief appropriate" in any case of an employer's
refusal to bargain. Instead, make-whole relief is "appropriate"
only where an employer, claiming merely to challenge the validity of election results, refuses to bargain as a dilatory tactic
intended to stifle employees' organization."0
C. History of the Make-Whole Order Under the NLRA
The ALRB's power under section 1160 of the ALRA "to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice"5 1 is identical to that of the NLRB under section 10(a) of
the NLRA.5 2 Likewise, the NLRB has the specific power to
remedy unfair labor practices and is required by section 10(c)
to issue an order "requiring such person to cease and desist
from such unfair labor practice and to take affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees, with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]."" Unlike section 1160.3 of the ALRA, however, section 10(c) contains no
express provision for make-whole relief.
An employer violates section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA when
he improperly refuses to bargain with a union. Unions, therefore, have often requested a make-whole order to reimburse
the effected employees for any benefits they would have obtained if the employer had not refused to bargain and a contract had been executed. In the late 1960's, the NLRB considered these requests and granted oral argument "on the
possibility and propriety of its adopting additional or new
methods to remedy unlawful refusals to bargain in violation of
section 8(a)(5). ' 54 Specifically, the NLRB looked at "whether
[it had] the authority to order an employer to reimburse his
employees for the loss of wages and fringe benefits that they
50. Id. at 39, 603 P.2d at 1328-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The limited legislative
history that does exist on the ALRA also supports the conclusion reached by the
court that the Act did not intend make-whole relief to be applied on an across-theboard basis. In the hearings before the Senate committee reviewing the bill, then-

Secretary of Agriculture and Services (now Chief Justice) Rose Elizabeth Bird "testified that the provision authorizes the Board to award make-whole damages only when
the Board has determined that an employer refused to bargain and acted in bad
faith." Id. at 38, 603 P.2d at 1328, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
51. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160 (West Supp. 1981).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
53. Id. § 160(c).
54. McGuiness, supra note 9, at 1086.

1078

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

would have obtained through collective bargaining if the em55
ployer had not refused to bargain in good faith."

The NLRB considered whether or not it had the authority to award make-whole relief in Ex-Cell-O Corp. In that
case, the union had won an NLRB election and was certified
as the employees' bargaining representative. The employer
advised the union that it would refuse to bargain and would
seek appellate court review of the NLRB's union certification.
The union filed an unlawful refusal to bargain charge and also
requested a make-whole order based on the employer's refusal
to bargain. The trial examiner recommended that the employer be ordered to pay monetary damages for its refusal to
bargain, but the NLRB refused to approve the recommended
order and stated that it did not have the statutory power to
7
order the make-whole remedy.

The NLRB decision in Ex-Cell-O clearly rejected the position granting make-whole relief taken earlier by the Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in Tiidee Products."
The appellate court had previously formulated the first judicial test for determining the appropriateness of make-whole
relief for an employer's unfair labor practice: if the litigation
raised "patently frivolous objections," make-whole relief
would be an appropriate remedy.59 Yet, the NLRB refused to
apply the remedy even in a "Tiidee situation," stating that it
could not
agree that the application of a compensatory remedy in
8(a)(5) cases can be fashioned on the subjective determination that the position of one respondent is 'debatable'
while that of another is 'frivolous.' What is debatable to
the Board may appear frivolous to a court, and vice versa.
Thus, the debatability of the employer's position in an
8(a)(5) case would itself become a matter of intense
litigation. 0
55. Id. at 1086-87 (footnote omitted).
56. 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd and remanded sub noma.Auto Workers v.
NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 108-11.
58. 426 F.2d 1243, 1248-53 (1970).
59. Id. at 1248. In Tiidee, the company's refusal to bargain was a clear and

flagrant violation of the law. Its objections to the election were patently frivolous and
violated the express terms of the agreement for a consent election entered into with
the union.
60. 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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The NLRB has not disagreed with the court of appeals'
recognition of the need for a remedy that will "advance the
policies of the Act, and prevent the employer from having a
free ride during the period of litigation"" in refusal to bargain
cases. Yet, the NLRB has not agreed with the court as to
what that remedy is. As evidenced in Tiidee, courts have accepted union proposals for a make-whole remedy in certain
situations. However, the NLRB has refused to grant makewhole relief under any circumstances.
III.

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING IMPOSITION OF
MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF

The NLRB's arguments for refusing to impose makewhole relief for an employer's refusal to bargain apply as well
to imposition of the award under the ALRA. The NLRB
stated its two principal objections to the make-whole award in
Ex-Cell-O. Briefly, the NLRB contended that a compensatory
remedy such as make-whole relief would be speculative, and
would require it to guess the terms of a future contract as well
as to assume that the agreement would be favorable to the
employees.62 Further, the remedy requires the NLRB to dictate the terms of the ultimate bargain, which the United
States Supreme Court has ruled it cannot do.68 Both of these
objections, it will be seen, are valid in the context of the calculation and application of the make-whole award by the
ALRB. While recognizing that the ALRB is required to follow
NLRB precedent, it also must adhere to the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, and the NLRB
interpreting the NLRA. Consequently, the ALRB should be
as reluctant to award make-whole relief as the NLRB is, despite the express grant of authority given to the ALRB to issue such an award.
The award, as applied by the ALRB, can be attacked on
61. Comment, Status of the Make-Whole Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases,
2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 153, 154 (1974)(quoting 426 F.2d 1243, 1251 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970)).
62. Yates, supra note 27, at 66 (citing McDowell and Huhn, NLRB Remedies
for Unfair Labor Practices, Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, Report No. 12
at 231 (1976) [hereinafter cited as McDowell and Huhn]).
63. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). Parties' freedom of contract
is not absolute under NLRA, but NLRB may not compel agreement merely because
parties themselves cannot agree.
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the additional ground that it interferes with union-employer
negotiation of contract terms which take place during postaward bargaining. This argument will also be discussed below.
A. Speculative Nature of the Award
Under common law principles of damages for private injury, a claimant is required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he has sustained an injury." The claimant
will be denied recovery if he cannot produce a reasonable basis from which damages can be computed, since otherwise, the
award would be conjectural and therefore penal."
The NLRB has observed these common law principles in
fashioning monetary awards. It has ordered monetary relief
for an injury resulting from a public wrong pursuant to the
NLRA only when the amount of the injury could reasonably
be calculated.6 6
Both the fact and extent of damage are difficult to ascertain in refusal to bargain cases. Nevertheless, to sustain an
order imposing make-whole relief, the union should first prove
that a contract would have been negotiated if the employer
had not refused to bargain. Additionally, it should prove, by
computation with reasonable accuracy, the value of the benefits that would have accrued under the contract. 7
1. Proof that a contract would have been executed.
To show that a contract would have been negotiated if
bargaining had occurred is not a simple task, even though
under the NLRA, contracts are negotiated in first bargaining
situations in approximately 85 percent of the cases where an
employer does not refuse to bargain." "Since employers who
64. Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an Employer's Refusal to Bargain: The Ex-Cell-O Doctrine, 46 TEx. L. REV. 758, 763 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Texas Comment]; see, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 688
(1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1941).
65. Texas Comment, supra note 64, at 763; see, e.g., Key West Hand Print
Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 605, 614 (S.D. Fla. 1966), afld per curiam,
381 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967).
66. See, e.g., Herman Sausage Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 168, 172-73 (1958), enforced,
275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658, 663 (2d
Cir. 1941).

67.

Texas Comment, supra note 64, at 764.

68. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 115 n.48 (1970). See generally Ross,
Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, 1966 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK
299, 306.

1981]

MAKE- WHOLE RELIEF

1081

violate the Act are usually more opposed to unionism and the
collective-bargaining principle than employers who do not violate the Act, an employer who unlawfully refuses to bargain
will be less likely to execute a contract with the union than an
employer who does not refuse to bargain." 9 This makes it
even more difficult for the union to prove that a contract
would have been executed.
The purpose of the make-whole remedy is to compensate
employees for the "lost opportunity to negotiate a contract,"
not to compensate them for a lost contract.7 0 Since the injury
is established by proof that the employer refused to bargain,
the amount of the recovery need only be reasonably calculable. Admittedly, the argument is weak because the probability
that a contract would have been negotiated determines the
value of the union's opportunity to bargain with the employer.7 1 "Establishing this probability with reasonable accuracy is as difficult as proving that a contract actually would
'72
have been negotiated.
2. Proof of the amount of the award
Calculating the benefits that employees would have received had their employer bargained in good faith is also very
difficult. In making this calculation, the Board must speculate
on the maximum amount the employer is prepared to give
and the minimum amount the union is willing to take. '
Three criteria for calculating the award were proposed in
the Ex-Cell-O case: "(1) the average collective-bargaining increments negotiated by all unions in either manufacturing or
nonmanufacturing establishments compiled by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics; (2) the average benefits obtained by the complaining union in other contracts it has negotiated; and,
(3) the benefits enjoyed under union contracts at the employer's other plants. '7 4 The second criterion represents the
closest approximation to the method of calculation adopted
by the ALRB for the make-whole remedy.
The California Supreme Court did not consider the calculation and application of the actual award in Norton; there69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Texas Comment, supra note 64, at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McDowell and Huhn, supra note 62, at 231.
Texas Comment, supra note 64, at 767.
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fore, the method adopted by the ALRB in Adam Dairy75 remains the standard by which the award is calculated in
California. The Board, in that case, had sought a formula for
fashioning the actual remedy which was reasonably accurate,
but simple, general, and nonspeculative enough to avoid
lengthy compliance hearings and further litigation.7 6 "As a
practical matter, the task before the Board in Adam Dairy
was to further the concurrent purposes of compensation and
collective bargaining without intertwining itself in the details
of bargaining to the point where 'the dictates of the State are
substituted for agreement of the parties.' "7

The ALRB first decided that the remedy, irrespective of
the method of its ultimate calculation, should be calculated to
run from the first refusal to bargain in good faith 7 8 and that
the award would be calculated at the time of the Board's decision on the unfair labor practice charges, rather than at a
post-hearing compliance proceeding. 9
In deciding upon the method for computing the award,
the Board rejected the union's recommendation that each particular provision of a hypothetical contract and its alternatives should be considered separately--a so-called "costingout" approach. Recognizing that such an approach "requires
far too much time to be spent in gathering information and
making calculations, and contains too much potential for dispute over detailed components of the award," 81 the Board instead adopted a more generalized formula, patterned after the
calculation set forth in proposed amendments to the NLRA as
part of the Labor Reform Act of 1977."'
The ALRB, in calculating the Adam Dairy make-whole
award, examined thirty-seven other agricultural contracts to
determine the average negotiated wage rates, before ordering
the employer to make its employees whole for the "net" difference between the basic wage rate in effect at the time of
75. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (April 26, 1978).
76. Yates, supra note 27, at 674.
77. Comment, Make-Whole Under the ALRA: Its Applicability and Scope, 13
U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 999 (1978-79)(quoting Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4
A.L.R.B. No. 24 at 9 (April 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S.F. Comment].

78.

Yates, supra note 27, at 675.

79.
80.
81.
82.

U.S.F. Comment, supra note 77, at 999.
Id. at 1000. See also Yates, supra note 27, at 674.
Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 at 13 (April 26, 1978).
H.R. REP. No. 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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the unfair labor practice and the average negotiated wage rate
of the thirty-seven other contracts.83 The Board determined
that the term "pay" in section 1160.3 also included fringe
benefits, and these were incorporated in the remedy as well.8
Lastly, the Board looked to U.S. Department of Labor materials"8 relating to the percentages of total compensation represented by basic wages and fringe benefits, and determined
that twenty-two percent of the total compensation represented fringe benefits, and the remaining seventy-eight percent represented basic straight-time wages. 6
The ALRB's method of computation was specifically proposed in Ex-Cell-O and was criticized by the NLRB as being
"too speculative because the statistics utilized will be related
only indirectly to the parties involved in the particular proceedings and therefore will not reflect the attributes of the
particular employer and union involved, which are the critical
factors that determine what concessions the employer would
have made." ' This criticism has not lost its validity in the
context of the calculation of make-whole relief under the
ALRA. The ALRB's method of computation is no less speculative than it was recognized to be in Ex-Cell-O, and for this
reason, it should have been rejected by the ALRB.
B. The Board's Remedy Intrudes into the Collective Bargaining Process
One strong argument against imposition of the makewhole remedy, which parallels the argument that the makewhole remedy is impermissibly speculative, is that the Board,
by assuming that a contract would have been reached, and
then determining what the essential terms of the agreement
would have been, is in effect, making a contract for the parties.as Such action clearly contradicts the policies of both the
NLRA and the ALRA. 89
83. Comment, The Make-Whole Remedy: California's ALRB Deals with Refusals to Bargain, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093, 1105 (1979).
84. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 at 7 (April 26, 1978).
85. Id. (citing 1977 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee
Compensation in the Private Nonfarm Economy (1974)). The ALRB took the data
for nonmanufacturing employees as the best proxy for agricultural laborers.
86. U.S.F. Comment, supra note 77, at 1001; Yates, supra note 27, at 675.
87. Texas Comment, supra note 64, at 767.
88. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970).
89. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1981), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)
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The national labor policy precludes government intervention into the substantive terms and conditions of collective
bargaining. "[T]he duty to bargain collectively does not carry
with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of
collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory."9 0 The Supreme Court affirmed this basic policy in its first interpretation of the NLRA when it stated, "The Act does not compel
agreements between employers and employees. It does not
compel any agreement whatever."9 1
Section 8(d) of the NLRA and section 1155.2(a) of the
ALRA contain identical provisions that the Act "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 'e2 The Supreme Court in H.K. Porter
Co.9 3 held that although the NLRB had the power to require
employers to negotiate, it was without power, under section
8(d) of the NLRA to compel a company or union to agree to
any substantive contractual provision of a collective bargaining agreement. 4
The NLRB confronted the Porter holding in Ex-Cell-O
when it said:
The [make-whole] remedy . . . operates retroactively to
impose financial liability upon an employer flowing from
a presumed contractual agreement .... [T]he employer
has not agreed to the contractual provision for which he
must accept full responsibility as though he had agreed to
it. [T]here is no basis for such a remedy unless the Board
finds, as a matter of fact, that a contract would have resulted from the bargaining .... The employer . . . is
forced to accede to terms never mutually established by
the parties.
Who is to say in a specific case how much an employer is
prepared to give and how much a union is willing to take?
and § 8(d) of the NLRA provide that the duty to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession."
90. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
91. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). NLRA does
not compel agreements between employers and employees or any agreement
whatever, but proceeds on theory that free opportunity for negotiation is likely to
promote industrial peace and bring about adjustments and agreements, which the act
itself does not attempt to compel.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1981).
93. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
94. Id. at 102.
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Who is to say that a favorable contract, would, in any
event, result from the negotiations? To answer these
questions, the Board would be required to engage in the
most general, if not entirely speculative, inferences to
reach the conclusion that employees were deprived of specific benefits as a consequence of their employer's refusal
to bargain. 5
The ALRA provision prohibiting the ALRB from compelling agreement is identical to that contained in the NLRA.
More importantly, as earlier stated, the ALRB is required to
follow applicable NLRB precedent." For these reasons, then,
the Supreme Court holding in H.K. Porter restricts ALRB interference in the collective bargaining process as it does
against the NLRB. Similarly, the constitutional premise to
the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. American National
Insurance Co. 97 that the NLRB "may not, either directly or
indirectly, compel concession or otherwise sit in judgment
upon the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement" is thereby equally applicable to the ALRB."
In fashioning its make-whole remedy, the ALRB has ignored this NLRB precedent and the express direction to follow it. The NLRB stressed in Ex-Cell-O that "there is no basis for the remedy unless the Board finds, as a matter of fact,
that a contract would have resulted from the bargaining." 99 As
it was calculated in Adam Dairy, however, the remedy was
forced upon an employer in terms determined by the Board,
and the employer was provided with no opportunity to assent
to or reject the terms. Clearly, California's legislative intent is
not to impose a contract on the employer, but through the
application of the make-whole award, the ALRB can impose a
contract on the employer indirectly, under the guise of an
"equitable remedy,"1 00 even though it is without direct power
to do so. Indeed, section 1155.2(a) forbids it to do so. Taken
together with applicable NLRB precedent, then, it follows
that unless it first finds that there would have been a contract
95. 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108-10 (1970).
96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1981).
97. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
98. Id. at 404. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312-18
(1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960).
99' 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 110 (1970).
100. Hearings on Sen. Bill No. 1 Before Senate IndustrialRelations Comm.,
Third Ex. Sess. (1975) (statement of Rose Elizabeth Bird).
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but for the employer's failure to bargain, the ALRB has no
basis to impose the make-whole award.
The ALRB presumes 0 1 that losses of pay have been suffered in every case in which it is found that an employer has
improperly refused to bargain. Yet, agreement is not always
reached between employers and certified unions even when
bargaining is conducted in good faith.102 It should therefore
not be assumed in every refusal to bargain case that had the
employer initiated bargaining earlier, agreement would have
been reached upon a binding contract, much less that this
presumed agreement would have brought increased wages and
other benefits to employees. The ALRB does not possess some
second sight which enables it to "find" that which the NLRB
has specifically held cannot be found-namely, that a contract
would have been reached, but for the employer's failure to
bargain.
C. The Award Creates Expectations in the Union and the
Employees
In addition to the basic objection that the award indirectly forces substantive contract provisions on an employer,
the ALRB's application of the award arguably interferes with
union-employer negotiation over contract terms which will
take place during post-awardbargaining because it creates expectations in the union and the employees. 0 3
When the employer and the union begin to negotiate the
terms of the future contract, the union will base its bargaining
position on terms which the Board has awarded in its makewhole remedy; the union inevitably will want to regard the
make-whole award as the "floor" in bargaining with the employer. This argument is persuasive once it is realized that no
union can afford to return from the bargaining table with a
contract containing less favorable terms than the terms set by
the Board in its make-whole remedy and expect, at the same
time, to maintain the support of a majority of the employees.
Consequently, the application of ALRB's make-whole relief
101. Perry Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 at 9 (March 10, 1977).
102. See text accompanying note 68 supra. See generally Ross, Analysis of AdministrativeProcess Under Taft-Hartley, 1966 LAB. REL. Y.B. 299, 306.
103. Amicus curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, J.R. Norton Co., Inc. v.
ALRB, L.A. No. 31026 at 63-64 (ALRB No. 77-CE-166-E; 4 ALRB 39) (June 22,
1978).
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results in the imposition of contract terms upon an employer
for the period of the make-whole remedy, as well as the creation of a baseline for all future bargaining. The employer is
thus placed at a substantial disadvantage when the parties ul104
timately begin to bargain.
By far, the strongest argument against the ALRB's calculation and application of the make-whole award is that the
remedy, as applied, impermissibly intrudes into the bargaining process. The NLRB has stressed this point consistently in
refusing to grant the award. It is true that the NLRA contains
no express provision for make-whole relief, so the NLRB's
contention that it lacks statutory authority to issue such an
award does not apply to the ALRB. However, at least one federal court of appeals case 05 has held that the NLRB possesses
the authority to issue the remedy, and yet the NLRB has repeatedly refused to do so. The NLRB's argument, therefore,
should be viewed as extending beyond its basic contention
that it is without statutory power to issue the award, and
should be based more correctly upon the restriction set forth
in section 8(d), and construed by the Supreme Court, that the
NLRB may not compel agreement between the parties. When
this restriction prohibiting Board interference in the bargaining process is correctly viewed as the real basis for the
NLRB's refusal to issue make-whole relief, it becomes clear
that the ALRB should also refuse to issue the award in those
situations where doing so would intrude into the parties' bargaining. It seems reasonable to conclude that the ALRB
should not issue the award in the absence of some type of
prior agreement between the particular parties upon which
the award can be based.
104. Id.
105. The District of Columbia Circuit has disagreed with the NLRB's holding
in Ex-Cell-O and has held in a number of cases that the NLRB possesses the statutory authority to grant the make-whole remedy. See Southwest Regional Joint Board,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Levi Strauss) v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB
(Quality Rubber Co.), 430 F.2d 519, 521-22 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Int'l Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee Products, Inc.), 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). Other circuits have considered the makewhole remedy but have avoided ruling on the NLRB's statutory authority. See, e.g.,
Steelworkers (Metco, Inc.) v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1974); Bartenders Local
703 (Restaurant and Tavern Ass'n) v. NLRB, 488 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); Lipman Motors. Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.
1971).
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In short, assuming that the Legislature did not intend to
enact two inconsistent provisions within the ALRA, the express authority granted the ALRB by section 1160.3 of the
ALRA to issue the make-whole award must be viewed as restricted by section 1155.2(a). The Board, of course, has the
legal authority to issue the award, but the award, as applied,
may be illegal if the restriction contained in section 1155.2(a)
is ignored. The California Supreme Court did not consider the
possible illegality of the award when it held simply that the
award is "appropriate" whenever an employer commits a clear
and flagrant refusal to bargain designed to stifle employee organization. For the preceding reasons, the court should have
gone further and held that, in addition to the aforementioned
standard, the award is "appropriate" only when it can be issued without contravention of the restriction set forth in section 1155.2(a).
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE

ALRB'S

CALCULATION AND

APPLICATION OF THE MAKE-WHOLE AWARD

Several possible alternative methods exist by which the
ALRB could award make-whole relief so as to avoid the taint
of illegality discussed above. One such alternative is that the
ALRB could receive and consider evidence as to the relative
economic strengths of the parties before it, thereby affording
the Board some evidentiary basis for concluding whether or
not a contract would have been agreed upon and what its
terms and conditions would have been. 106 It seems unlikely
that the Board would choose such an approach, however, considering the ALRB's desire to avoid taking "too much time..
. [in] dispute over detailed components of the award. 10 7 This
approach, however, is preferable to the Board's current one,
and it should be considered even if it would mean an increase
in Board involvement in the calculation of the award.
A second possible approach, and one which would not ignore the restriction in section 1155.2(a), is for the Board to
direct a conditional remedy to be effectuated only if and when
106. Amicus curiae Brief on behalf of Nisei Farmers League and San Joaquin
Nisei Farmers League in Support of Petitioner, J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, L.A. No.
31027 at 45. (June 22, 1978).
107. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 at 13 (April 26,
1978).
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the parties actually negotiate a binding agreement through
the free process of collective bargaining.10 8 The Board, if it
chose this approach, would direct that should the parties ultimately agree upon a contract, the contract terms would be
retroactive. In this way, the make-whole award would compensate employees for their actual losses, by utilizing only
those terms that the parties themselves had negotiated and
agreed upon. This approach has a serious flaw, however, since
it provides the employer with absolutely no incentive to reach
an agreement with the union, and therefore would be contrary
to the Act's basic policy of encouraging collective
bargaining.1 09
The most sensible and equitable approach that the Board
could take and still retain the power to issue the award is simply to narrow the "appropriateness of relief" standard beyond
that which was set forth by the California Supreme Court.
The award should be "appropriate", as the court held, only in
cases of clear and flagrant refusals to bargain, and only where
the award can be based on terms and conditions of an agreement previously reached between the parties. Because there
must necessarily have been a prior agreement between the
parties, it appears that make-whole relief would not be appropriate in the context of an initial refusal to bargain. In these
cases, the ALRB would simply have to adopt the position
taken by the NLRB and look to the standard cease and desist
order to remedy the employer's unfair labor practice.
It is important to note that two bills have been introduced in the California Legislature which would effectively repeal the ALRA and replace it with the NLRA. Assembly Bill
34 (A.B. 34), introduced December 1, 1980, at the urging of
various labor interests, attorneys and farmer organizations,
provides that identical rules would govern all labor unions, including farm labor unions. Senate Bill 50 (S.B. 50) is identical
to A.B. 34 and was introduced as a backup measure to provide
an alternate vehicle in the event A.B. 34 failed to move.
108. Amicus curiae Brief on behalf of Nisei Farmers League and San Joaquin
Nisei Farmers League in Support of Petitioner, J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, L.A. No.
31027 at 45 (June 22, 1978).
109. The declared policy of both the ALRA and the NLRA is to promote peaceful settlement of disputes by encouraging collective bargaining and by protecting employee rights. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (West Supp. 1981).
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The authors1 10 of both bills appear guardedly optimistic
at this time with respect to passage of the bills in both houses
of the Legislature. However, due to the intense controversy
associated with the bills, a lengthy battle appears likely. The
measures undoubtedly will be vigorously opposed by the
United Farmworkers and it is not certain whether the Governor would sign either bill into law even after passage in the
Legislature.
Obviously, the passage of either bill would eliminate the
present controversy surrounding the ALRB's application of
the make-whole remedy. It may not, however, be necessary to
do away with the make-whole provision in its entirety in order
to avoid the problems that arise when it is applied in a refusal
to bargain case. As discussed earlier, if the ALRB initiated the
restriction of the application of the award to only those cases
in which the terms and conditions of other parties' contracts
need not be relied upon, the remedy could effectively carry
out the basic policy of the Act to encourage collective bargaining, and at the same time, would not offend the Act's equally
important policy of maintaining freedom of contract between
the parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

Unless the ALRB narrows its standard beyond that
adopted by the California Supreme Court in Norton and applies make-whole relief to only those cases in which the Board
need not rely on the terms and conditions of other parties'
contracts, make-whole relief, though a legal remedy, will be
illegal as applied.
This comment stresses the need for the ALRB to reconsider its calculation and application of the award in light of
section 1155.2(a) of the ALRA, which prohibits the Board
from intruding into the collective bargaining process, beyond
the consideration which it has professed already to have
made.' A serious reexamination of NLRB precedent in this
area is also warranted, and it is crucial that the Board not lose
sight of the fact that it is bound in its actions by this federal
110. William A. Craven, Senator, Thirty-eighth District; Richard Lehman, Assemblyman, Thirty-first District.
111. Adam Dairy dba Rancho Dos Rios, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 at 10-11 (April 26,
1978).
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precedent.
The problems announced by the NLRB in its so-called
"Ex-Cell-O Doctrine" remain just as evident under the ALRA
and cannot be ignored by the ALRB. The most serious problem under both Acts is that make-whole relief cannot be imposed upon an employer if the award itself impermissibly involves either the NLRB or the ALRB in the bargaining
process. The ALRB has been given the authority to grant
make-whole relief, but such authority cannot be exercised at
the expense of other provisions contained within the ALRA. It
is the writer's opinion that in calculating and applying the
award in its present form, the Board has exercised its authority at the expense of other ALRA provisions, namely the provision which prohibits the Board from compelling agreement
between the parties, and the provision directing the Board to
follow applicable NLRB precedent.
The proposed legislation in this area should not be necessary in order to eliminate the problems inherent in the application of the make-whole remedy, provided that the ALRB
correctly interprets the present law. The introduction of A.B.
34 and S.B. 50 is important, however, as a warning to the
ALRB that it must interpret the Act so that all provisions are
given effect. The mere authority to grant make-whole relief
given to the ALRB does not allow it to disregard certain provisions of the Act in favor of others or to ignore the well-established and well-reasoned NLRB precedent in this area.
Mary Lynne Thaxter

